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CHASING BRAND VALUE:  
FULLY LEVERAGING BRAND EQUITY TO MAXIMIZE BRAND VALUE 
 
Abstract 
 
Both researchers and practitioners seek to understand how to leverage brand equity to 
create value.  Adopting “the theoretical separation of brand equity and brand value” framework 
originally proposed in the Journal of Brand Management by Raggio and Leone1, this conceptual 
article looks more closely at the brand value construct and the implications of the proposed 
theoretical separation.  The authors argue that firms are continually attempting to “chase” the 
appropriable value of their brands – defined as the theoretical maximum value that a brand could 
achieve if all brand equity were fully leveraged.  Implications for developing measures of brand 
value are discussed. 
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“Brand equity is often equated with brand valuation but that is 
like confusing your house (asset) with its financial worth (price)2”  
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The purpose of this conceptual article is to investigate the implications of “the 
theoretical separation of brand equity and brand value” proposed by Raggio and Leone3, 
on the brand value construct.  The framework can be used to understand past managerial 
decisions related to brands and their value, and to analyze future valuation scenarios.  The 
framework also will help managers and researchers understand the drivers of brand value 
as they attempt to evaluate current valuation methodologies and to develop new ones.  
Finally, it will relate the brand value construct to a similar construct, customer equity.  
The article relies on insights that can be gained from applying the framework to well-
known historical and current brand case studies.  Such insights will demonstrate the 
power of the framework in-use.   
In an earlier article that appeared in JBM, Raggio and Leone distinguished 
between brand equity, conceived of as an intrapersonal construct that moderates the 
impact of marketing activities, and brand value, which is the sale or replacement price of 
a brand.  They argued that it is inappropriate to confuse brand equity – one potential 
driver of a brand’s value – with its financial value.  Such a distinction is emphasized in 
the opening quote from Ambler, and is important because both researchers and 
practitioners seek to understand how to leverage brand equity to create brand value that 
then can be captured by the firm.   
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  To motivate the paper, we 
first discuss the concepts of creating and appropriating value and describe two levels of 
brand value – current brand value and appropriable brand value.  We then offer a well-
known case example to demonstrate the concepts of interest in-use.  Next we review the 
differences between brand equity and brand value, and discuss the concept of 
appropriable value in more depth.  We then describe the process of “chasing” brand value 
and discuss how firms create brand value that can be chased.  We finish the paper with a 
discussion of how brand value relates to a conceptually similar construct, customer 
equity, how the framework informs attempts to develop measures of brand value, and 
suggest directions for future research.   
CREATING AND APPROPRIATING VALUE 
Mizik and Jacobson4 state, “Firms need to simultaneously develop or acquire 
value creation capabilities and capabilities that facilitate value appropriation.”  But due to 
resource constraints, firms are forced to emphasize either value creation or value 
appropriation based on strategic priorities.  They define strategic emphasis as the relative 
emphasis a firm places on value appropriation relative to value creation.  Their research 
shows that the stock market rewards increased emphasis on value appropriation over 
value creation, but it is obvious that value must be created before it can be appropriated.  
This article is not concerned with a firm’s strategic emphasis, but rather with the 
processes involved in both creating and appropriating value.  As brands constitute the 
largest asset for many firms5,6,7, and brand valuations positively impact financial market 
performance8,9,10,11, it is critical that managers understand clearly what brand value is, and 
how they can create and capture as much of that value as possible.   
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LEVELS OF BRAND VALUE  
Brand value must be considered from a firm’s perspective, and generally can be 
thought of as the sale or replacement price of a brand.  This value will vary depending on 
the owner (or potential owner) of the brand, as different owners may be able to capture 
more or less of the potential value of the brand, based on their ability to leverage brand 
equity.  For a specific firm, Figure 1 identifies the two important levels of brand value, 
“current” and “appropriable,” identified by Raggio and Leone12.  Both measures of brand 
value are subjective and dependent upon the resources and capabilities of a focal firm.  
For a particular firm, at a particular point in time, and all other things being equal, a firm 
will recognize a “current” value.  This current value is based on projected profits that will 
accrue to the current owner with its existing strategies, capabilities, and resources.  
However, there may exist a higher “appropriable” value13 that the firm could capture if it 
were better able to more effectively leverage existing brand equity.  At a fixed point in 
time, both values would represent the net present value of all future brand profits.   
 
 
 
Figure 1: Levels of Brand Value14 
“Current” 
“Appropriable” 
Ability to leverage  
Brand Equity 
[determines the level 
of brand value] 
Brand 
Fully-leveraged 
Brand Equity 
At a particular point in time, for a particular firm: 
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All else equal, the difference between the current and appropriable value of a 
brand is based on the firm’s ability to leverage the brand equity of that brand.  
Appropriable brand value represents the theoretical point at which all existing brand 
equity is optimally leveraged (i.e., all existing brand equity is leveraged).  The “current” 
measure of brand value defines “what is” for a particular firm, while unleveraged brand 
equity helps define “what can be,” i.e., the appropriable value, for a firm.  We now 
consider a well-known case that will demonstrate the concepts of current value and 
appropriable value in-use, and will introduce the new concept of chasing strategies.   
Quaker Oats purchased the beverage brand Snapple in 1994 for $1.7 billion and 
sold it three years later to Triarc for $300 million.  Commenting on the quick loss of the 
brand’s value, The New York Times noted that “Quaker Oats’ distribution strength rested 
in supermarkets and drug stores, not the smaller convenience stores and gas stations that 
constituted more than half of Snapple’s sales at the time of purchase15”.  We can assume 
that Quaker Oats believed that the price it paid for Snapple was below the value that it 
could generate either through the combined supermarket, drug, convenience and gas 
station channels or through its marketing strategies.  That is, Quaker Oats’ estimate of 
Snapple’s potential value (what we call appropriable value) must have been above its 
purchase price.  Similarly, Snapple managers must have considered both the value they 
expected to generate by continuing to own and manage the brand under current 
leadership, capabilities, resources and strategies (what we call current value), and the 
higher appropriable value that they could capture if they continued to invest in the brand 
and/or in additional capabilities and resources.  Simple economics suggests that Snapple 
must have found Quaker Oats’ bid to be above its estimated current value and sufficiently 
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close enough to its estimate of appropriable value that it was more attractive to sell the 
brand than to continue to own and manage the brand in hopes of chasing (attempting to 
capture some of) the higher appropriable value.   That is, the purchase price paid by 
Quaker Oats must have been greater than Snapple’s NPV calculation of its expected 
appropriable value at some given time period in the future. 
The case offers a few interesting theoretical possibilities to consider.  Quaker Oats 
may have lacked the ability to effectively manage the brand in the new channels; it may 
have overestimated the acceptance of the quirky brand in more mainstream channels; 
and/or, the beverage market may have changed after the acquisition in a way that 
disadvantaged Snapple vis a vis other brands in the beverage category.  We will develop 
these possibilities more fully in a subsequent section, but note that regardless of the 
actual circumstances, it is clear that Quaker Oats did not realize the value from the 
Snapple brand it had expected.   
We argue here that firms are continually attempting to increase the appropriable 
value of their brands by building brand equity, and then chase that appropriable value, or 
position a brand to sell it to another firm that has a higher estimate of appropriable value 
or greater chasing ability.  We suggest that the concepts of current brand value, 
appropriable brand value, and “chasing” strategies have not been addressed previously 
due to the prior lack of a clear distinction between the constructs of brand equity and 
brand value.  The next section will review the distinction between these two constructs 
before we continue with our investigation of brand value.   
BRAND EQUITY VS. BRAND VALUE 
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As early as 1991, Srivastava and Shocker16 proposed that brand equity is a 
multidimensional construct composed of brand strength and brand value.  Brand strength 
addressed the consumer effects associated with brands and is consistent with Keller’s17 
customer-based brand equity.  Brand value addresses the financial valuation of a brand, 
which can be thought of as the sale or replacement price of a brand.  Despite the fact that 
Srivastava and Shocker suggested this distinction more than 15 years ago, researchers 
continue to use the two terms (brand equity, brand value) interchangeably18,19,20,21,22.   
Raggio and Leone23 established a theoretical separation between the constructs of 
brand equity and brand value.  The simplest way to show the difference between the 
constructs is to consider brands suggested in the literature as “zero equity24”, e.g., private 
label, store, or own brands.  We assert that even these brands have value since, given that 
the brand is available in the market, one would assume the firm selling the branded 
product realizes some value from those sales, and that its actions indicate that it would be 
more expensive for it to create a new brand from scratch than to continue selling products 
under the existing brand name.  Likewise, it would be less expensive for another firm to 
enter the market with one of these existing brand names than to create a new one.   
The need to establish the distinction between brand equity and brand value is 
clearly evident in the introduction to the award-winning paper “Revenue Premium as an 
Outcome Measure of Brand Equity25.”  The authors cite five well-known and respected 
scholars to demonstrate that “there is agreement among researchers on the general 
definition of the concept.  Brand equity is defined as the marketing effects or outcomes 
that accrue to a product with its brand name compared with those that would accrue if the 
same product did not have the brand name26.”  The authors state that these outcomes can 
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be related to consumers (e.g., attitudes, awareness, image, and knowledge) or at a firm 
level (e.g., price, market share, revenue, and cash flow).  The different levels of outcomes 
reflect Srivastava and Shocker’s27 original dimensions and Raggio and Leone’s 
distinction between brand equity and brand value, but an important question must be 
asked: if brand equity is defined as the outcomes or results of some unnamed and 
unmeasured construct, what is that construct and why are researchers not concerned with 
it?  Revenue premium is offered as an outcome measure of an outcome measure of some 
mysterious force.  Similarly, Faircloth, Capell and Alford28 define brand equity as “the 
biased behavior a consumer has for a branded product versus an unbranded equivalent.”  
Consistent with researchers’ investigations of other marketing constructs (e.g., 
commitment, attitudinal loyalty), we suggest that researchers should focus on the source 
or driver of such biased behaviors.   
Based on a conception of “brand” as a promise of benefits,29,30 Raggio and 
Leone31 defined brand equity as the perception or desire that a brand will meet its 
promise of benefits.  This definition positions brand equity as an intrapersonal construct – 
that mysterious biasing force alluded to by previous researchers – that has the ability to 
produce the outcomes listed above.  Outcomes of brand equity should be classified as 
potential outcomes, due to the fact that even when brand equity exists, some or all of 
these outcomes may not occur.  For example, if a person holds a large amount of brand 
equity for a brand of scotch but is a teetotaler, then such equity should not produce any of 
the positive firm-level outcomes (those related to purchase or consumption).    
Raggio and Leone demonstrated how a consumer’s brand knowledge, which is 
gained from various sources such as brand-related marketing efforts, experience, word-
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of-mouth, etc., contributes to brand equity,32 as opposed to being brand equity itself, or 
an outcome of brand equity.  They also showed that brand equity moderates the impact 
and effectiveness of future marketplace activities such as advertising or pricing (e.g., 
price promotions), ultimately impacting not only intrapersonal outcomes such as 
consideration, attitudes, and commitment, but also downstream market-level outcomes 
such as purchase, price premium, and behavioural loyalty.   Jones has demonstrated that 
“other equities” besides those directly associated with consumers (such as channel and 
employee equity) can be considered a part of a brand’s equity and as such can also 
positively impact brand performance33.  Ultimately, downstream market-level outcomes 
(caused by a variety of factors, but all related to the brand and its equity) contribute most 
directly to a brand’s value.          
APPROPRIABLE VALUE 
An estimate of the appropriable value of a brand could be based on sources that 
include the superior resources of competitors or the “vision” of an individual.  This 
framework suggests that Borden, which sold its Cracker Jack brand to Frito Lay in 
October, 1997, did so because it believed that it would be able to capture more of the gap 
between Borden’s current value and the larger appropriable value of the brand by selling 
it to Frito Lay rather than by owning it and increasing its investment in the brand.  This 
belief may have been based on the assumption that Cracker Jack would benefit greatly 
from Frito Lay’s core strengths of distribution and marketing: Frito-Lay owned a 15,000-
truck direct-to-store delivery system, which one industry consultant estimated “would 
add 10 to 15 market share points [for Cracker Jack] in the category”34.  In fact, after 
acquiring Cracker Jack, Frito-Lay was able to double Cracker Jack sales, posting double-
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digit sales increases each year, for the next two years35.  The decision by Borden 
executives to sell Cracker Jack made good business sense since they knew that the 
Cracker Jack brand would be more valuable within the Frito Lay system than it could 
ever be in its own system, and therefore Frito Lay would pay more for the brand than 
Borden could ever extract on its own.  Therefore, by selling Cracker Jack Borden was 
able to capture more of the appropriable value (from Frito Lay) that Borden could not 
have captured had it continued to own the brand.  
 There are companies that recognize and capitalize on the concept of appropriable 
value.  Private equity firms like KKR represent the “visionaries” that attempt to identify 
brands (or companies) that have a large gap between current value and appropriable 
value.  After acquiring a brand, their objective is to build the brand equity for that brand 
up to the point where other companies recognize the potential to chase a higher 
appropriable value, at which point KKR sells the brand at a price that captures a part of 
the buying firm’s appropriable value for itself.  This leaves the acquiring company in a 
position to “chase” the remaining value between the purchase price (becoming current 
value for the acquiring firm) and the perceived appropriable value of the brand.  This 
framework could also be applied to P&G’s recent acquisition of Gillette by arguing that 
Gillette built its brands to the point that P&G recognized the high appropriable value that 
P&G could chase if Gillette’s brands were managed from within P&G’s system.   
If a firm acquires a brand, but subsequently misses its financial projections (such 
was the case with Quaker Oats and Snapple), it could be attributed to (1) a lack of ability 
to leverage existing brand equity, (2) an initial mismeasurement of brand equity that lead 
to an overly optimistic assessment of appropriable value36, or (3) changes in the 
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marketplace that reduce appropriable value (e.g., greater attention on environmentally-
friendly products may have reduced the appropriable value of the Hummer brand after it 
was purchased by General Motors).  Of course, it should also be possible to exceed 
projections if (1) a company’s initial estimate of brand equity were lower than what 
actually existed, (2) the company was better able to leverage the existing brand equity 
than projected, (3) the company was able to build and leverage additional brand equity 
beyond what was projected prior to purchase, or (4) advantageous changes in the 
environment increase appropriable value.  In this sense, the purchase of brands is 
somewhat analogous to the purchase of oil leases, except that in the oil lease scenario, the 
acquiring firm is not able to increase the actual amount of reserves (we demonstrate 
below that it is possible to increase a brand’s appropriable value).  At the time of 
purchase, the true amount of reserve is unknown - only an estimate exists.  The failure to 
extract as much oil as projected could be due to either an inaccurate estimate of true 
reserves, or an inability to extract those that are there. 
CHASING BRAND VALUE 
It is important to consider a brand over time, since over time, both current and 
appropriable value can change.  In Figure 2a., the vertical line represents the sale of a 
brand from one firm to another.  Before the sale, the seller has a current value (Vc) and 
has been able to capture only a certain amount of the appropriable value (Va) of the 
brand.  If the buyer believes it possesses superior resources or capabilities, it will be able 
to “chase” the appropriable value and close the gap between current and appropriable 
value through application of its marketing resources and capabilities that leverage brand 
equity.  Such a scenario would play out when a particular selling firm realizes that it 
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lacks the resources to close the gap through owning and managing the brand, or faces 
high opportunity costs associated with keeping its resources tied up in the brand, and 
decides to capture more of the brand’s appropriable value by selling the brand in the 
factor market (e.g., Borden and Cracker Jack).  Obviously, such a sale would occur when 
the selling price is above the value the current owner believes it could generate by 
managing and investing in the brand (including opportunity costs), and below the 
acquiring firm’s perception of its appropriable value37.    
 
 
 
Figure 2: Chasing Brand Value Over Time 
 
 
 It is interesting to recognize that if an acquiring firm already possesses resources 
and capabilities that are at least equivalent to anything the current owner could develop, 
and all other things being equal (such as discount rate and brand equity), that the 
prospective owner’s estimate of appropriable value should not be less than that of the 
current owner.  This is due to the fact that if the current owner must invest in additional 
resources or capabilities in order to leverage brand equity and capture more of the 
appropriable value, then this investment would be subtracted from the realized value of 
 
“Current”  Va
 
Over time:   
time
Seller  Buyer 
“Current”  
“Appropriable”
time a b  
2a. 2b. 
“Appropriable” Vc 
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the brand, making it more profitable to sell the brand than to invest more in it and 
continue to own it.  The same would be true in the case of high opportunity costs that 
make it difficult to justify holding on to the brand. 
 There are several factors that will impact both current and appropriable brand 
value.   For example, R&D activities can increase the appropriable value of a brand if the 
activities generate patentable or hard-to-copy technologies or help secure the 
endorsements of experts.  These assets have the potential to increase brand equity which 
can then be leveraged in order to chase appropriable value.  Consider when Crest 
toothpaste first acquired approval by the American Dental Association (ADA).  In Figure 
2b, time a represents the acquisition of the approval.  If P&G (Crest’s owner) does 
nothing to promote the fact until time b, current value would not change, appropriable 
value would increase, and the gap between current and appropriable value (for the current 
owner, P&G) would increase during this time period.  If P&G did not take advantage of 
this approval, then it would not be fully leveraging the brand equity that existed in the 
brand, and therefore its current value (to P&G) would not be increased by the approval.   
If at time b P&G decides to place the ADA logo on Crest packaging, P&G’s 
current value at time b would increase.  It would increase to even a higher level if P&G 
were to place the logo on the packaging and incorporate the new ADA approval in its 
advertising and collateral material.  Such activities represent attempts by the current 
owner to increase and then chase the appropriable value of its brands.  This is exactly 
what P&G did and Figure 3 shows how over time Crest was able to grow and ultimately 
switch places with the previous market leader, Colgate.  
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Figure 3:  The Impact of ADA Approval on Crest’s Market Share38  
 
 
 
We note that any brand equity-building activity – whether done for an existing or 
new brand – if successful, will by definition increase appropriable value due to the fact 
that appropriable value is driven by brand equity.  Thus, the company that creates a new 
brand must first focus on developing the brand equity of the brand, and then the company 
can chase the associated appropriable value. 
 Our framework also helps to inform the determination of selling price (or 
purchase price) by indicating the range of prices at which a firm might sell a brand.  
Theoretically, the lower limit is the owner’s estimate of current value, and the upper limit 
is the acquiring firm’s estimate of the brand’s appropriable value.  However, the selling 
Crest 
Colgate 
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firm wants more than its current value since it believes it will increase this value over 
some time horizon and the buying firm wants to pay less than its estimate of the brand’s 
appropriable value in order to realize a gain.  In negotiation terms, these two values 
demarcate the so-called “zone of possible agreement”.  Figure 4 provides a stylized 
example of how our proposed framework can be applied to the Snapple case presented at 
the beginning of the paper. 
 
 
Figure 4:  Positioning Selling Price Within of Zone of Possible Agreement Based On 
Proposed Brand Value Framework. 
 
 
 In 1994, when Quaker purchased Snapple (see the left side of Figure 4), the 
purchase price of $1.7 billion would have been somewhere between Snapple’s estimate 
of current value (lower limit) and Quaker’s estimate of appropriable value (upper limit).  
Quaker believed it would be able to chase the higher estimated appropriable value 
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(represented by hashed area) and realize a significant gain in value.   The thin upward-
sloping freeform line under “Snapple’s Estimates” represents the actual increase in 
Snapple’s brand value as Snapple (the company) chased the brand’s appropriable value.  
At the time when the sale was being contemplated, this line represented Snapple’s 
estimate of the brand’s current value.  The continuation of the line past the date of 
purchase indicates that Snapple may have assumed that it could successfully chase 
additional appropriable value if it were to continue to own and invest in the brand.  The 
thin upward-sloping freeform line under “Quaker’s 1994 Estimates” represents the 
projected increase in Snapple’s brand value as a result of Quaker’s plans to chase the 
brand’s appropriable value after purchase.   
 Over the three years that Quaker owned Snapple, Quaker’s estimates of Snapple’s 
current and appropriable value must have dropped precipitously (see the right side of 
Figure 4), in order to justify a sale price of only $300 million.  The thin downward-
sloping freeform line under “Quaker’s 1997 Estimates” represents the actual decrease in 
Snapple’s current brand value under Quaker’s ownership, while the thin upward-sloping 
freeform line under “Triarc’s Estimates” represents the projected increase in Snapple’s 
brand value as a result of Triarc’s plans to chase the brand’s appropriable value after 
purchase (hashed area between Triarc’s purchase price of $300m and its estimated 
appropriable value).     
CREATING BRAND VALUE THAT CAN BE CHASED 
The ability to leverage brand equity is dependent upon company resources (i.e., 
what companies currently have) and/or capabilities (i.e., what they can do with brands - 
the ability to grow brand equity).  These assets can be thought of as “multipliers.”  A 
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“have” multiplier relates to physical resources such as a strong company name, 
relationships with the channel, access to new markets (e.g., international), capital 
markets, etc.  When considering the value of an existing brand within a focal company’s 
portfolio, the existence of multipliers is commonly called “fit.”  Fit can apply to existing 
brands, channel, marketing resources, capital markets, media, strategies/objectives, etc.   
Frito Lay’s distribution system is a good example of a channel multiplier.  Its 
system and channel relationships were projected to immediately increase the value of the 
Cracker Jack brand when it was acquired, which it did39.    
P&G’s purchase of Gillette had the potential to take advantage of several 
multipliers.  For example, Gillette’s portfolio contained brands that were sold in the same 
categories as those sold by P&G, but were targeted to men (e.g., deodorant, shaving), 
whereas P&G’s strength was with women.  Gillette’s Duracell brand also gave it entrance 
into new markets (batteries).  In 2006 P&G boasted 50 “megabrands,” on which it spent 
more than $10 million in the U.S. alone, four of them coming from the 2005 Gillette 
acquisition40.  That $40 + million bump in advertising from the new Gillette brands 
increases its media-buying power.  Another example would be Henkel’s 1997 purchase 
of Loctite that gained it a listing on the NYSE.  Simply being listed on the NYSE could 
have added value to the Loctite brand through additional credibility with capital markets.   
The ability to build brands and brand equity can be viewed as a “can do” 
multiplier (i.e., what a firm can do with a brand).  Some firms invest considerable 
resources to develop the capabilities necessary to build strong brands and to grow brand 
equity.   For example, Kimberly Clark and P&G have brand management systems that 
allow them to increase the appropriable value of their brands through constantly growing 
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the brand equity of their brands.  This helps them manage brands they develop within the 
company, as well as any brands they acquire by developing new strategies to chase the 
higher appropriable value.  Consider P&G’s purchase of Olay and Old Spice.  Both of 
these brands were laden with “old” associations, but the company was able to leverage 
key positive associations and build each of the brands’ equity41.  
Because of the existence of multipliers, a brand can be more valuable to an 
acquiring company than it would be to a company without the associated multiplier.  This 
suggests that brand valuation methods that attempt to derive a general value may 
underestimate the value to firms that possess a large number of multipliers and 
overestimate the value to firms that do not possess those same multipliers.  We believe 
that even when brand equity is not changing over time, it is a company’s ability to 
leverage that equity that determines the value of the brand to that company and this 
ability clearly varies across companies.   
In addition to moderating the firm’s ability to leverage brand equity, managerial 
capabilities influence the success of strategic and tactical decisions such as market 
definition, which affects the scope of the brand (i.e., mass vs. niche), and myriad other 
tactics and strategies (e.g., pricing, promotions, positioning, advertising, research 
spending, etc.) that impact brand profitability and thus brand value.  For example, choice 
of branding strategy (corporate branding vs. house of brands vs. mixed branding) has 
been found to impact values of Tobin’s Q42, a measure of a firm’s intangible assets, of 
which brands are the major component.  Poor strategies, tactics or execution may leave a 
brand with poor profits even though it has a high appropriable value.  If a potential 
acquirer believes it can better leverage unexploited equity it should be able to improve 
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the profitability of the brand.  In such a case, the potential acquirer would believe it could 
achieve a higher appropriable value for the brand than the current value produced by the 
existing owner of the brand.  In other cases, prior managerial decisions or actions, or 
market factors (in the case of fads) may have depleted the brand’s equity and left a new 
owner very little to leverage.   
Brands also are valuable in ways not directly related to customers, or consumers 
in general.  Del Vecchio, et al.43 demonstrate that strong brands make it easier for 
companies to hire better people cheaper.  HR costs are lower as a result.  This research 
provides evidence that brands contribute value in ways that are not measured by 
contribution, but should be considered in the sale or replacement price of the brands.  
Because employees need not be prospects for the company’s products, it follows that 
value added through reduced HR costs (or other overhead items) may not be directly 
impacted by customers, or consumers in general, but they do affect the company’s 
profitability and thus the value of its  brands.  Failure to consider such sources of brand 
value underestimates their true value, and highlights the distinction between equity and 
value discussed in an earlier section.   
Del Vecchio, et al.44 also suggest that brands may contribute value through relationships 
with capital markets (e.g., more attractive credit terms), relationships with governmental 
or regulatory agencies (e.g., more attractive tax incentives), and channel relationships 
(e.g., easier access to shelf space).  As defined above, these relationships would represent 
assets that could be considered “multipliers.” 
Gupta, Lehmann and Stuart45 proposed that customer lifetime value can be used 
to estimate firm value.  Since customer lifetime value (CLV) is a contribution-based 
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approach, the previous discussion indicates that CLV-based valuation methods will 
systematically underestimate firm value to the extent to which strong brands impact  
firms’ overhead costs as well as revenues, providing a potential explanation for cases in 
which Gupta et al.’s46 valuation did not match a company’s stock price-based valuation. 
To summarize this section, we argue that brands generate value for their owners 
through two general mechanisms:  (1) a mechanism that generates value directly via 
impacted sales volume and profitability enabled by firm resources and capabilities, and 
(2) a mechanism that indirectly generates value for the company, by lowering costs in 
areas such as allowing a company to hire better people cheaper47.   
RELATIONSHIP OF BRAND VALUE TO CUSTOMER EQUITY 
Customer equity is defined as the net present value of the future stream of 
contribution from all of a firm’s current and future customers48,49.  Customer equity is 
focused on the financial outcomes that are generated by a firm’s customers. Its focus on 
outcomes is similar to the focus of the brand value construct, but brand value has two 
features that distinguish it from customer equity.  First, brand value considers profit from 
all sources, whether or not they are directly related to customers (i.e., licensing, patents, 
tax incentives, ability to attract employees, attractive loan rates etc.), and not only 
contribution.  Secondly, both current and appropriable brand values are considered.  
Current value is based on projected profits that would accrue to the current owners 
assuming existing strategy, capabilities and resources.  Appropriable value is based on 
projected profits that would accrue to a firm that fully leveraged the existing brand 
equity.   
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We suggest that customer equity is a part of overall brand value, but it does not 
include the overhead cost-reducing benefits of strong brands, nor does it consider the 
option value of brands (i.e., appropriable value).  This distinction makes the brand value 
construct more comprehensive and applicable to the firm as a whole.  However, since 
marketing managers only may be able to control the direct variable costs of their brands, 
this may render the customer equity construct (which considers only contribution) a more 
actionable one at operational levels of the organization. 
We suggest that customer equity is actually a company-based concept, not a 
customer-focused concept as suggested by Rust, Lemon and Zeithaml50, as it is an 
outcome measure focused on how much contribution a company can collect from its 
customers.  We are in agreement with their statement that successful brands reflect the 
identities of their customers and not the identities of their owners, but we suggest that this 
is merely consistent with the marketing concept and not a unique outcome of applying the  
customer equity concept.  Finally, we suggest that the company-based perspective of 
customer equity supports our assertion that customer equity should be considered a 
component of brand value.   
ESTIMATING BRAND VALUE 
If companies did not know how to value brands, then brands could never be sold.  
Since brands frequently are sold, this problem must not be intractable.  While owners 
may have difficulty justifying their valuations to prospective suitors (or vice versa), this 
has not kept managers on either side from estimating a value for a brand.  The “problem” 
of brand valuation has mostly to do with how to reliably value brands so that they may be 
included on financial statements, or be measured for taxation or managerial control 
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purposes51.  We will not attempt to review all the relevant literature or the current 
standards which apply, but will instead attempt to position the issue of valuation within 
the context of our brand value framework. 
It should be clear from our previous discussion that in a perfectly stylized world 
where a company owns a single brand, the most convenient measure of brand value 
would be current value.  This is an estimate of the financial impact of the brand on the 
firm given its current strategies, capabilities and resources.  In such a world, the firm 
would devote all its resources to maximizing the value of the brand, estimate a reliable 
measure of current value, and clearly understand what would be necessary to chase the 
appropriable value of the brand.  In fact, the gap between current and appropriable value 
would reflect a “capabilities,” rather than an “attention,” gap.  All multipliers would be at 
unity as there would be no marginal benefit of any “other.”   Also, issues related to the 
separation of brand name from company name52 would be irrelevant since the two names 
would, at worst, exist in a one-to-one relationship (e.g., a company with only one brand) 
with no “carryover” to or from other brands; at best, they would be identical (e.g., IBM, 
Philips, Hyundai).   
But even in such a stylized world, it is not clear that current value is the value that 
analysts, managers or tax collectors would want to be reported.  Remember that current 
value is sensitive to managerial actions, which are not always optimal, and therefore 
could produce values that are too low.  It is also sensitive to the impact of resources or 
capabilities that may be inimitable or non-substitutable53, producing values that could not 
be attained by another firm in the industry.  Imagine a scenario in which a brand is 
excised from its owner and transplanted into an average (or representative) firm in the 
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industry.  It should be clear from the prior discussion that the transplanted brand may be 
more or less valuable to the new host firm than it was to the original owner due to 
differences in resources and/or capabilities.  Thus, the reliability of current value as a 
“pure” (i.e., objective) measure is in question.   
Furthermore, such a stylized world rarely exists in practice.  In the real world, 
firms own multiple brands and seek to maximize overall firm value as opposed to the 
value of any particular brand.  They may stop using brands, yet retain rights to them, and 
then reintroduce them at a later time (e.g, Black & Decker’s DeWalt; Coca Cola’s Tab).  
P&G relinquished its rights to the White Cloud brand name even though the brand clearly 
retained brand equity and hence, value.  This is clear given that Wal-Mart was 
subsequently able to capture that value by acquiring the brand name and selling White 
Cloud as an own brand through its stores.   
It should be clear that a measure of brand value that is included in financial 
statements must contain more than financial performance or outcome measures.  It must 
also include estimates of brand potential.  For example, it must be able to generate a 
positive valuation even when a brand is producing no revenue.  We argue that this 
potential is captured through the equity that a brand has built.  Thus, the desired measure 
is some combination of current and appropriable value that also segregates “system” 
multipliers from brand value.  That is, it must recognize the potential to leverage a certain 
amount of existing equity, but it should not consider value that is derived from non-brand 
sources.   
To cite a few examples of how the above considerations are factored into 
valuation methodologies, we note that Young & Rubicam’s Brand Asset Valuator looks 
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beyond current profitability or high awareness in its assessment of brand potential.  And 
Interbrand’s valuation methodology recognizes the impact of multipliers by subtracting 
non-brand factors such as distribution systems54.  We would argue that each of these 
approaches recognizes the difficulties with brand valuation and attempts to overcome 
them, yet questions of subjectivity and relevance remain55.   
Cravens and Guilding56 demonstrate that marketing managers identified greater 
managerial implications of brand valuation than accounting managers did.  They note that 
marketing managers are more comfortable working with “less objectively verifiable data 
and have not been conditioned by conventional accounting practice that discourages 
capitalization of intangibles” 57.  They also find that brand managers regard brand 
valuation as useful for evaluating marketing’s performance, acquiring corporate 
resources, improving long-term performance, and strategic planning.  It is in such a 
capacity that our framework is particularly helpful.   
For managerial purposes, a firm would want to estimate both current and 
appropriable value and reward managers for increasing both.  Programs aimed at 
capturing value (e.g., advertising) have the potential to increase current value.  Programs 
aimed at increasing brand equity (e.g., R&D activities, partnerships) have the potential to 
increase appropriable value (e.g., P&G’s Crest).  Our framework will help managers 
better understand how the capabilities and resources of a firm contribute to either current 
and/or appropriable brand value.  It may be the case that a firm is good at creating 
appropriable value, but lacks chasing ability (e.g., Borden and Cracker Jack).   Likewise, 
many inventors are able to come up with concepts that have huge potential (appropriable 
value), but they have little (or no) ability to chase that value (commercialization) since 
Chasing Brand Value                  
 25  
they may have strong technical skills, but little or no business background.   In other 
cases, a firm may be good at chasing, while not increasing the potential of the brand as 
measured in appropriable value.  In any case, firms must clearly understand the 
capabilities and resources necessary to become better at either creating or chasing 
appropriable value, or be capable of evaluating other options for the brand (i.e., sale).   
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH OPPORTUNITIES 
One need only read current headlines to see how the concepts addressed in this 
article critically impact managerial thinking regarding the management and ownership of 
brands.  At this writing, Ford Motor Company is debating whether to sell all of the 
remaining European brands—Volvo, Jaguar, Land Rover—it acquired over the last 20 
years (Ford sold Aston Martin in March 2007 to a British group for $848 million)58.  
Jaguar, Volvo, and Land Rover make up the Premier Automotive Group which cost Ford 
$11.68 billion to acquire, but lost $2.32 billion in 2006.  A venture capitalist is reportedly 
preparing a $5.9 billion bid for the group – significantly less than what Ford paid.  Ford 
clearly miscalculated its ability to chase the appropriable value of those brands or the 
level of the appropriable value, or both.  At this point, Ford must consider the current 
value of each of the brands in its Premier group (including any opportunity costs of 
continuing to own the brands), their respective appropriable values, and the likely offers 
of prospective bidders.  As long as Ford can receive a price that is above its current value, 
then it can guarantee a higher return than it could have otherwise generated, and at the 
same time remove the risk of having to continue to invest heavily in the brands to chase 
appropriable value, which are important considerations to a company that “desperately 
needs focus in terms of preserving its capital and concentrating its management 
Chasing Brand Value                  
 26  
resources,” according to John Casesa, managing partner of Casesa Strategic Advisors 
LLC in New York59.  What will actually happen is unknown, but it is clear that Ford and 
prospective suitors will focus on these concepts as deliberations and negotiations 
proceed.   
From a managerial standpoint, brand managers’ primary task is to maximize and 
leverage brand equity in order to increase brand value.  Our framework provides brand 
managers with a more comprehensive understanding of all the component parts than ever 
has been presented in the literature.  It introduces the concept of appropriable value, 
which, all other things being equal, is the value that could be realized if all existing brand 
equity were fully leveraged.  Our framework is consistent with both the literature on 
mergers and acquisitions60 and with current managerial practice (e.g., P&G’s purchase of 
Gillette).  The two levels of brand value help us understand the components of a 
valuation that would be required on a financial statement, but are most valuable to brand 
and marketing managers for managerial purposes.   
The current debate over the relationship between brand equity and customer 
equity is addressed by positioning customer equity within the domain of brand value.  In 
this light, we agree with Rust, Lemon and Zeithaml’s61 model that positions brand equity 
as a contributor to brand value (of which we suggest customer equity is a part).  While 
customer equity is a managerially useful construct, especially at operational levels, our 
perspective represents a more comprehensive view of the relationship between brand 
equity, customer equity and brand value.  In summary, we have demonstrated that 
customer equity is actually a partial measure of brand value, and should not be 
considered an “equity” construct.   
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Delvecchio, et al.62 have offered the only research to-date that specifically 
addresses potential sources of brand value beyond customers or consumers in general.  
We suggest that a more thorough understanding of non-consumer-based sources of brand 
value is needed.  It is provocative to consider that brands may represent inefficiencies in 
capital markets or points of leverage with governmental or regulatory agencies.  Such 
new knowledge will assist in understanding the degree to which CLV-based models will 
systematically underestimate firm value.   Though not the main focus of this article, it 
will assist researchers in their efforts to include the value of intangible assets on the 
balance sheet.  Barth, Clement, Foster and Kasznik state, “A major reason precluding 
accounting recognition is concern about whether brand values are reliably estimable”63.  
We suggest that the proposed framework contributes to understanding the reliability of 
brand valuations by offering a means by which all the potential contributors to brand 
value may be identified.  
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